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The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is the most famous corruption evaluation since its first 
publication by Transparency International (TI), in 1995. This index is also considered the most robust 
measure of corruption perceptions. However, since it precisely refers to perceptions, it inevitably faces 
some limitations. Although Transparency International continuously advocates for a better use of its 
indexes, policy makers keep using the CPI as a decision making tool. 
In a previous article we isolated the role played by the media in corruption perceptions. We 
previously suggested that young democracies were penalized by Transparency International. Indeed, 
we showed that media aperture leads to a better coverage of corruption deeds and therefore drives a 
stronger perception of already existing - but not yet broadcasted - corruption. 
Our  previous  paper  was  using  cross-section  data.  Pursuing  more  consistent  evidence  and 
robustness improvement, we collected time series to perform a panel data analysis, questioning the 
stability and precision of our earlier findings. 
In this new paper, we investigate the link between democracy and corruption perceptions, in the light 
of a possible opening bias, we already called “reflective bias”. 
 
Résumé : 
 L’indice de perception de la corruption de Transparency International (TI) est le plus célèbre 
des indicateurs de corruption depuis sa première publication, en 1995. Cet indicateur est également 
considéré comme la plus robuste des mesures de ce fléau. Cependant, puisque il s’agit précisément 
d’un indicateur basé sur des perceptions, il connait certaines limites. 
 Bien que Transparency International appelle inlassablement à une utilisation plus prudente de 
ses indicateurs, les décideurs continuent de lui prêter un rôle d’outil d’aide à la prise de décision. 
Nous avions isolé, dans un article précédent, le rôle joué par les médias dans les perceptions de 
la corruption. Nous avions suggéré que les jeunes démocraties puissent être pénalisées par l’indicateur 
phare  de  Transparency  International.  En  effet,  nous  avions  montré  que  l’ouverture  des  médias 
conduisait  à  une meilleure  couverture des actes de  corruption, entrainant avec elle une plus forte 
perception de la corruption déjà existante, mais non révélée. 
Notre article précédent utilisait des données en coupe transversale. Dans un souci d’amélioration de la 
robustesse  et  de  la  précision  de  l’analyse  précédemment  menée,  nous  avons  collecté  des  séries 
temporelles  afin  d’entreprendre  une  analyse  en  données  de  panel.  Dans  ce  nouvel  article,  nous 
analysons  le  lien  entre  démocratie  et  perceptions  de  la  corruption  à  la  lueur  d’un  possible  biais 
d’ouverture des régimes en place, biais que nous avions qualifié de ﾫ réflectif ﾻ. 
 
Keywords: Corruption, Governance, Corruption perception index, CPI, Transparency International, Corruption 
measurement, Perception indicators, Press freedom, Freedom house.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Transparency International  (TI) Corruption  Perception  Index is the most famous corruption 
index since its first publication in 1995. This index is also considered as the most robust measure of 
corruption  perceptions.  However,  since  it  precisely  refers  to  perceptions,  it  inevitably  faces  some 
limitations. Henceforth, governance index hazards are well documented, a growing literature criticizes 
governance assessment (Arndt C. & Oman, C.P. (2006); Becker, L. B., Vlad T., & Nusser, N. (2007); 
Kaufmann,  D.,  &  Kraay,  A.  (2008)…).  However,  most  of  the  already  identified  limits  focus  on 
methodology, while only a few investigates measurement bias (Razafrindrakoto, M. & Roubaud, F. 
(2005), Olken, B.A. (2009)...). 
 
Although Transparency International continuously advocates for a better use of its index, policy 
makers keep using it as a decision making tool. 
This article aims to demonstrate the existence of an aperture bias, calling for a cautious use of the CPI, 
especially for young democracies.  
 
Seeking to isolate better the impact of a political regime move on corruption perceptions, we 
collected time series. We first hesitated on the appropriate measure of democracy. Freedom House has 
also been criticized, but remains one of the most followed democracy evaluation producers. 
Other datasets are nevertheless available proposing dictatorship-democracy distinction or democracy 
scores (Cheibub, J.A. Ganhdi, J. & Vreeland, J.R. (2009); the Bertelsmann Transformation Index; the 
Democracy Score from Economist Intelligence Unit, etc.).  
Nonetheless, our purpose here is to analyze to most widespread indicators, therefore we choose two 
datasets produced by Freedom House: “Electoral democracy” and “Freedom in the world”. For the 
latter, we will more specifically use one of its sub-components: the “Political Rights” index.  
 
In this paper, we also introduce a new measure of the size of shadow economy, compiled by 
Schneider, F. and alii (2010) and available in time series (1999-2007) with a large coverage (162 
countries). If their authors appear influenced by the public choice school, their methodology is fully 
described, allowing data users to make their own judgment of a prospective ideological bias.  
We introduce this data as a control variable; intuition would command that corruption and the size of 




2.  Preparatory analysis 
A.  Data description 
 
Transparency International CPI ranks countries using a 1 to 10 scale
1, 1 standing for widespread 
corruption and 10, standing for a corruption-free country. We collected time series from 1996 to 2008. 
During these thirteen years, the CPI coverage widely increased (41 countries were evaluated in 1996, 
up to 179 countries in 2008), the resulting missing values ultimately provide an unbalanced dataset we 
will need to check for heteroskedasticity pitfalls.  
                                                             




As  previously  mentioned,  we  chose  two  Freedom  House  indexes  as  democracy  indicators
2: 
Political Rights index and Electoral democracy dataset. 
The “Political Rights Index” ranks countries according to the width of democracy. “Countries and 
territories with a rating of 1 enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair elections. 
Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are competitive, the opposition plays an 
important role and enjoys real power, and minority groups have reasonable self-government or can 
participate in the government through informal consensus.”
3 
 
Overall,  Freedom  House  operates  a  distinction  referring  to  three  categories.  A  country  is 
qualified as “Free” if it scores between 1 to 3. From 3 to 5, a country is considered “Partly free” and 
from 5 to 7, it is flagged as “Not free”.  
Political Rights have been evaluated this way since 1972. Although the methodology evolved since 
then, for the period 1996 to 2008 it appears consistent. Political Rights index covers 192 countries. 
 
In our previous article, we used the “Press Freedom Index” to assess regime aperture across 
countries. However, press freedom indicators have been constructed quite recently, therefore it was 
not possible to take benefit from consistent time series (e.g. “Freedom of press barometer” (Reporter 
Without  Borders)  is  available  since  2002;  “Freedom  of  Press  Index”  (Freedom  House)  first 
publication was launched in 2004). 
 
We  decided  to  use  also  a  binary  measure,  classifying  countries  in  two  groups:  “Electoral 
democracies” and “Dictatorship”. We first created a dummy variable - we labeled “Political Regime” -
with the table provided by Freedom House
4; 0 standing for “non democratic regimes” and 1 standing 
for “Electoral democracy”. 
 
As control variables, we selected the logarithm of GDP per capita available in the World Development 
Indicators  (World  Bank),  the  Human  Development  Index  (HDI-UNDP)  and  the  size  of  shadow 
economy  (in  percentage  of  GDP).  This  last  variable  is  aggregated  by  Schneider,  F.  Buehn,  A. 
Montenegro, C.E. (2010), the methodology and the time series are detailed in this article: “Shadow 
Economies all over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 2007”. 
 
As  first  analysis,  we  draw  a  correlation  matrix  (Table1  page  5)  describing  our  data.  The 
correlations among these variables are significant. As previously observed
5, the correlation between 
press freedom and the selected democracy index (Political Rights) is very strong
6 (R²= -0.913).  
 
The Corruption Perception Index is also strongly correlated with HDI, GDP per capita, and the size of 
shadow economy. To better evaluate the relative impact of these variables on corruption perceptions, 
we will need to perform further econometrics analysis. 
 
                                                             
2 More information on Freedom House methodology: Freedom House (2010a). 
3 Freedom House (2010a). 
4 Freedom House (2010b). 
5 Brown, J. Orme, W. Roca, T (2010). 
6 The negative sign comes from the inverse scale of these indexes. For the Press freedom index, 100 stands for a 






B.  A first description of CPI and political regime change 
 
In order to have a first taste of the distribution of political regime changes and the CPI, we then 
constructed a qualitative variable, capturing changes between two benchmark dates within a ten years 
gap. We chose the last ten years and decided to observe the change of the regimes during two dates: 
2009 and 1999. Our “Political Regime Change” variable is then coded this way: 
 
Political Regime Changei = Country Political Regime i, t=2009 - Country Political Regime i, t=1999 
 
Therefore “Political Regime Change” variable is a cross-section data and takes the following values: 
0: no political regime changes recorded. 
1: Country i became an Electoral democracy 
-1: Country i  is no longer an Electoral democracy 
 
In the same way, we computed a “CPI Variation” variable:  
CPI Variation i,t = CPI i,t=2009 - CPI i,t=1999  
 
This variable takes the following values: 
0: Country i have the same CPI score in 2009 and in 1999 
>0: Country i was perceived less corrupted 
<0: Country i was perceived more corrupted. 
 
We used these variables to draw a chart, giving a first description of the CPI evolution regarding 
political regime changes: 
 
Table 1. Corruption Perception Index and its determinants, correlation matrix (Pooled dataset) 






















Pearson correlation  1.000 
       
  
Sig. (2-tailed)    
       
  
N  1495 





Pearson correlation  -0.587***  1.000 
     
  
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000    
     
  
N  1495  1495 
     
  
Log GDP per 
capita 
Pearson correlation  0.757***  -0.527***  1.000 
   
  
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000  0.000    
   
  
N  1459  1459  1459 
   
  
HDI (UNDP) 
Pearson correlation  0.697***  -0.510***  0.860***  1.000 
 
  
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000  0.000  0.000    
 
  






Pearson correlation  -0.698***  0.363***  -0.624***  -0.557***  1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000       




Pearson correlation  0.662***  -0.913***  0.506***  0.519***  -0.405***  1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000    
N  810  810  777  756  567  810 



























Due  to  the  limited  coverage  of  the  CPI  ten  years  ago,  our  sample  is  rather  small  (98 
observations). Considering the evolution between 1999 and 2009 we observe a few political regime 
changes. Only 4 countries became democratic and 8 became authoritarian. Moreover, the classification 
produced by Freedom House may be challenged.  
However - but taken with a pinch of salt - it appears that in this sample, the four countries that became 
democratic  also  recorded  a  stronger  corruption  perception.  In  the  case  of  countries  that  became 
authoritarian, it seems not possible to identify a real trend. 
 
Observing this representation, we might assume that young democracy may record an  increase  in 
Transparency International index. 
 
Obviously  we  need  to  perform  a  more  consistent  analysis  to  state  whether  or  not  a  democracy 
deepening leads to a stronger corruption perception and to reveal the dynamics of these variations.  
 
For the next analysis, we will use the Freedom House Political Rights Index as measure of democracy 
depth. With its 1 to 7 scale it appears much more precise. Furthermore, its time and space coverage is 


























































Chart1. CPI variation and regime change 


































C.  Exploring the relation between Political Rights and the Corruption Perception 
Index 
 
In our earlier paper, we put the light on the quadratic association between the CPI and press 
freedom. As we showed that Political Rights and press freedom are strongly correlated, we assume 
that the quadratic association also applies to the Political Rights & CPI relationship. To question this 
assumption, we draw a curve estimation (pooling our panel dataset) to determine which model fit the 





























1.  Results interpretation 
We  constructed  this  chart  keeping  Singapore,  which  can  be  considered  as  a  severe  outlier.  The 
adjustment curve estimation confirms our intuition, the association between Political Rights and the 
CPI may rather be described by a quadratic model than by a linear one (Quadratic adjustment R² 
(0.533)  >  Linear  adjustment  R²  (0.381)).  We  display  in  Table  2,  a  comparison  of  the  two  curve 
estimations, with and without Singapore. These results show that the relation between democracy and 
corruption perception is not linear. The underlying idea is that a deepening of democracy has not the 
same  impact  on  corruption  perception  whatever  the  “maturity”  of  democracy.  Calculating  the 
adjustment  curve  critical  point,  we  will  be  able  to  differentiate  the  impact  of  a  democracy 
improvement vis-à-vis the CPI. 
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 0: Corrupted country 
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Table 2. Curve adjustments results, freedom of press and population perception of government corruption 
Ordinary least squares estimation (Pooled panel dataset) 
Coefficients   Coefficients without 
Singapore  with outlier 
Linear adjustment 
Variable 
Political of Rights  -0.646***  -0.668*** 
t  (-28.027)  (-30.205) 
R²  0.345  0.381 
Adjusted  R²  0.344  0.381 
Number of observations (N)  1495  1482 
Quadratic adjustment 
Variables 
Political of Rights   -2.464***  -2.611*** 
t  (-25.316)  (-28.767) 
Political of Rights
2  0.247***  0.263*** 
t  (-19.114)  (-21.900) 
R²  0.474  0.533 
Adjusted  R²  0.473  0.532 
Number of observations (N)  1495  1482 
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) 
 
2.  Critical point estimation 
The adjustment curve estimation gives the following parameters (Singapore included):  
CPI ≈ 8.55 -2.46PR +0.25PR² 
The minimum of this function is reached for its derivative equal to 0. 
-2.46+ 2 x0.25PR ≈ 0 
PR ≈ 4.99 
We thus obtain the Political Rights and CPI values for the critical point: (PR; CPI) ≈ (4.99; 2.40). 
 
3.  Further interpretation 
Theoretically, corruption perceptions should be a linear decreasing function of democracy intensity 
(Brown, J. Orme, W. Roca, T. (2010)). We suggest that the quadratic shape of the estimated curve 
reveals a measurement bias, resulting from media control in authoritarian regimes, hiding existing 
corruption deeds that are finally broadcasted in the early hours of democracy. 
 
As described previously, Freedom House uses three different categories for countries according 
to their score. Freedom House describes as “Free”, countries with an overall score higher than 5, 
otherwise countries are labeled “Partly free” and “Not free”. 
 
In this study, a 5 score at Political Rights index appears critical to understand perceptions dynamics 
and democracy maturity. Thus, if we use Freedom House terminology, in “Partly free” or “Not free” 
countries an increase of our democracy proxy, likely  widens corruption perceptions. On the other 
hand, in “Free” countries, a democracy deepening is associated to a lower corruption perception. As 
we did in our previous paper, we suggest that the Corruption Perception Index is biased for weak 
democracies and authoritarian regimes. Thereby, we may suggest that the CPI is biased for “Partly 
free” or “Not free” countries. 
 
We now have a better idea of the dynamic relation between democracy and corruption perceptions. In 
order to rigorously validate these assumptions, we need to introduce control variables. To have the 
strongest evidence possible, we perform a panel data analysis, with data from 1996 to 2008. 
 




3.  Corruption perceptions and democracy 
 
To perform a robust  econometrics analysis  we first need to investigate heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelations  issues.  Indeed,  missing  values  in  our  dataset  may  drive  to  an  unbalanced  panel, 
usually leading to heteroskedasticity. 
 
A.  Heteroskedasticity test 
 
To  detect  heteroskedasticity,  we  use  the  Breusch-Pagan  test.  This  test  evaluates  if  the  estimated 
variance of the residuals correlated with the explanatory variables; if so, we face heteroskedasticity 
and should take it into account. 
 
After estimating the residuals ui of the following equation: 
CPIij = αij + β1 Political Rightij + β2 square Political Rightij + β3 Log GDP per capitaij + ui + eij 
 
We performed a regression of the square of the residuals on the independent variables: 
û²i = αij + β1 Political Rightij + β2 square Political Rightij + β3 Log GDP per capitaij + vi + eij 
 
If the F-test confirms that the independent variables are jointly significant then we must reject the null 
hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  
 
We display above the results of the estimations of the square of the residuals: 
 
Table 3. Breusch-Pagan test: square residuals estimation 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  t   P>|t| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound 
Political Rights  -3.746***  0.049  -77.16  0.000  -3.841  -3.651 
Political Rights²  0.334***  0.006  54.47  0.000  0.322  0.346 
Log GDP per capita  9.361***  0.043  216.13  0.000  9.276  9.446 
Constant  -10.507***  0.215  -48.95  0.000  -10.928  -10.086 
N= 1459 
F(3,1455)= 53439.30 
Prob > F =  0 
R²=  0.991 
Adjusted R² =  0.991 
Dependent variable: square of the residuals 
     
 
Interpretation: 
The  F-test  shows  that  the  independent  variables  are  strongly  associated  with  the  square  of  the 
residuals. Therefore, we must reject the null hypothesis: our panel faces heteroskedasticity. 
Thus, to prevent biased estimations, we will need to perform a Generalized Least Square regression. 
 
 




B.  Autocorrelation test 
 
To detect autocorrelation in a panel data, we used a Wooldridge test, described by Drukker, 
D.M. (2003). The null hypothesis stands for no first-order autocorrelation.  
We display above the F-Test: 
F (1, 154) = 197.030 
Prob > F = 0.000 
The results show that we are not dealing with first-order autocorrelation, no further correction would 
be necessarily.  
 
C.  Estimating the impact of democracy on corruption perception 
 
Our objective is to evaluate the role of democracy on Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index. We showed previously that Political Rights are strongly correlated with corruption 
perceptions, fitting a quadratic functional form. To take into account this kind of non linear relation, 
we added the square of the Political Rights variable in our regressions. 
 
We suppose that corruption perceptions may also be explained by the GDP and the Human 
Development Index. We assume that richer countries may be less affected by the corruption scourge. 
Usual thesis defend that “developed” countries provide better salaries to officials and civil servants, 
reducing the opportunity cost of corruption. Moreover industrialized countries are known to possess 
stronger  institutions,  based  on  formal  rules  resulting  a  stronger  rule  of  law,  preventing  from 
widespread corruption behaviors. 
 
We equally used as control variable the size of shadow economy relatively to GDP, assuming that the 
size of shadow economy is a good proxy of the rule of law. 
 
As explained in the previous section, we used a Generalized Least Square estimation to fix the 
heteroskedasticity issue. We tested 4 different models, using GDP per capita, Human Development 




 CPIij = αij + β1 Political Rightij + β2 Political Rights²ij + β3 Log GDP per capitaij + ui + eij 
 
Model 2. 
CPIij = αij + β1 Political Rightij + β2 Political Rights²ij + β3 HDIij + ui + eij 
 
Model 3. 
CPIij = αij + β1 Political Rightij + β2 Political Rights²ij + β3 Shadow Economy Sizeij + ui + eij 
 
Model 4.  
CPIij = αij + β1 Political Rightij + β2 Political Rights²ij + β3 HDIij + β4 Shadow Economy Sizeij ui + eij 
 
We display in table 3, 4, 5 and 6 the General Least Square (GLS) estimation of these models. 
 




Estimation results for model 1. 
 
 
Estimation results for model 2. 
 
 
Estimation results for model 3. 
 
 
Table 4. Generalized Least Square estimation of the Corruption Perception Index determinants 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Political Rights  -1.259***  0.045  -27.78  0.000  -1.348  -1.170 
Political Rights²  0.125***  0.006  22.68  0.000  0.114  0.136 
Log GDP per capita  2.157***  0.043  50.04  0.000  2.072  2.241 
Constant  -1.740***  0.207  -8.38  0.000  -2.146  -1.333 
Wald chi2(3) = 10573.92 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
N= 1459 
Multicolinearity test (VIF max value square variables excepted) = 6.23 
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index 
   
Table 5. Generalized Least Square estimation of the Corruption Perception Index determinants 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Political Rights  -1.565***  0.052  -30.09  0.000  -1.667  -1.463 
Political Rights²  0.151***  0.006  23.89  0.000  0.138  0.163 
HDI  4.286***  0.133  32.29  0.000  4.026  4.546 
Constant  4.092***  0.145  28.31  0.000  3.809  4.375 
Wald chi2(3) = 6313.34 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
N= 1245 
Multicolinearity test (VIF max value square variables excepted) = 4.21 
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index 
   
Table 6. Generalized Least Square estimation of the Corruption Perception Index determinants 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Political Rights  -1.355***  0.043  -31.45  0.000  -1.440  -1.271 
Political Rights²  0.125***  0.006  22.36  0.000  0.114  0.136 
Shadow economy size  -0.076***  0.001  -55.16  0.000  -0.079  -0.073 
Constant  9.375***  0.054  172.77  0.000  9.268  9.481 
Wald chi2(3) = 16057.02 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
N= 1055 
Multicolinearity test (VIF max value square variables excepted) = 8.81 
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index 




Estimation results for model 4. 
Table 7. Generalized Least Square estimation of the Corruption Perception Index determinants 
Parameter  Coefficient  Standard error  Z   P>|Z| 
Confidence Interval 95% 
lower bound  upper bound 
Political Rights  -0.919***  0.051  -18.11  0.000  -1.019  -0.820 
Political Rights²  0.078***  0.006  12.16  0.000  0.065  0.090 
Shadow economy size  -0.061***  0.002  -39.42  0.000  -0.064  -0.058 
HDI  3.160***  0.104  30.49  0.000  2.957  3.363 
Constant  5.990***  0.123  48.81  0.000  5.750  6.231 
Wald chi2(4) = 17757.27 
Prob > chi2 = 0 
N= 1029 
Multicolinearity test (VIF max value, square variables excepted) = 8.92 
Dependent variable: Corruption Perception Index 
     
 
D.  Results interpretation 
 
As first observation, our results appear strongly significant. Moreover, the multicolinearity test 
performed
7 shows no specific multicolinearity issue. Political Rights, GDP and HDI seem to affect 
corruption perceptions the more.  
 
Moreover, the signs of the coefficients confirm first intuition. We remind that the highest score at the 
CPI  stands  for  a  corruption-free  country.  Thus,  a  high  GDP  and  HDI  prevent  from  widespread 
corruption perceptions, while a broad shadow economy increases corruption feelings. 
Our  four  estimations  corroborate  the  democracy  and  corruption  perceptions  dynamics 
previously unveiled. It confirms that corruption perceptions depend on the “maturity” of democracy 
and suggests that below a certain level, democracy deepening may lead to an increase of corruption 
perceptions. However, once overstepped this level, a democracy enhancement finally drives a decrease 
of corruption perceptions. This way, democracy and corruption perceptions are not linearly associated, 













                                                             




4.  Conclusion 
In  this  paper  we  investigated  the  tumultuous  relationship  between  the  Corruption  Perception 
Index and democracy (using Freedom House Political Rights Index as proxy). We performed a panel 
data analysis to question our earlier findings that had uncovered a measurement bias in the CPI. 
 
Using such an analysis, we were able to cover 1025 to 1459 different cases, within thirteen years. 
We find out that Transparency International likely misevaluates countries  scoring above 5 at the 
Political Rights index. Thus, we suggest that Transparency International underestimates corruption in 
authoritarian regimes.  
 
Media and press aperture are the result of a democracy deepening. In this context, corruption 
behaviors are then more likely flagged in the media and their authors more frequently pursued and 
punished. Thereby, theoretically, we expect a linear relationship between democracy and corruption, 
but the devil hides in the details… for instance, it hides in perceptions.  
 
If we assume democracy and corruption follow a linear association, we observed that democracy and 
corruption  perceptions  do  not.  Indeed,  while  authoritarian  regimes  progressively  achieve  their 
transition  towards  democracy,  they  face  an  increase  of  corruption  perceptions  –  the  quadratic 
functional form identified. We then suggest that we observe an increase of corruption perceptions that 
are not necessarily backed on an increase of the “real” amount of corruption. 
 
We  are  therefore  bound  to  confirm  that  Transparency  International  likely  penalizes  young 
democracies in regards to more authoritarian regimes. The CPI is then victim of the reflective bias
8. 
 
In the light of this analysis, we call for a cautious use of Transparency International Corruption 
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